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Abstract 
This paper examines the occurrence of structural breaks in European 
unemployment associated with major events experienced by the European 
economies at an institutional level: the creation of the European and 
Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999, and the Euro/financial crisis in 2008-2009, 
which was followed by a general and intensive reform process in the years 
afterwards. Beyond the well documented asymmetries across countries, we 
uncover different responses of adult and youth unemployment rates. While 
adult unemployment is more prone to experience structural breaks, youth 
unemployment is more sensitive to business cycle oscillations. This has been 
especially so in the recent crisis and calls for fine tuning policy measures 
specifically targeted to youth unemployed in bad times. One important 
implication of our findings is that generic labour market reforms are not 
effective enough to solve the youth unemployment problem across Europe. 
We point to educational policies that raise average qualifications and help 
school-to-work transitions as suitable complementary cures. 
Keywords: Unemployment, structural breaks, crisis, Eurozone, youth, 
education. 
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1. Introduction 
The Global Financial Crisis has led to a significant increase in unemployment after a long 
expansionary period. Aggregate unemployment in the European Union was 9.2 percent in 
1999, moved down to 7.2 percent in 2007, and rose to 10.2 in 2014. In the euro area, it 
decreased from 9.7 to 7.5 and then rose to 11.6 percent over the same years. Within the 
European aggregates, however, there are wide differences in the unemployment behaviour 
between countries. 
Unsurprisingly, the European periphery countries present the worst unemployment 
behaviour (Figure 1). At the start of the EMU, for example, Greece and Spain had 
unemployment rates around 12 and 14 percent, not far away from the 9 percent in Germany in 
1999. Since then, however, while in the Scandinavian and continental European countries 
unemployment rates have hardly changed across expansion (1999-2007) and crisis (2008-
2014), they have doubled in the periphery (Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece). 
 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
These developments have raised concerns about the persistence of high levels of 
unemployment (OECD, 2011; OECD, 2014) and its social an economic consequences: 
widespread deterioration of human capital, discouragement and labour market withdraw, 
effects on government budget and standards of living. These concerns are not however new. 
The seriousness of the high and persistent European unemployment problem has long been 
recognized, and countless theoretical and empirical studies have been undertaken to determine 
its causes (Layard et al., 1991; Bean, 1994; Ljungqvist, and Sargent, 1998; IMF, 1999; 
Blanchard, 2006, amongst many others). 
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However, most of these studies focus on the aggregate unemployment rate. As shown in 
Figure 2, youth unemployment rates may be characterised by different dynamics. Note, for 
example, that the rates in 2014 were larger than those of aggregate unemployment in all 
countries with no exception, both in 1999 and 2014. A second noteworthy feature is that 
unemployment increases were larger in youth unemployment in all economies with the 
exception of France and Norway. More precisely, the largest increases in the youth 
unemployment rate took place in Greece, Portugal and Spain (between 20 and 27 percentage 
points), followed by Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg (around 15 percentage points), and Sweden 
(10.6 percentage points). Note that Luxembourg more than tripled its youth unemployment 
rate, while in Sweden it almost doubled as it did in Austria. 
 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
In view of these differences, a disaggregated analysis of unemployment by considering 
specifically the youth and adult rates may uncover significant specific patterns, and thus be 
useful to refine some of the generic policy recommendations aiming at the restructuring of the 
so called unfriendly labour market institutions (employment and unemployment protection 
legislation, union power, fiscal wedges). This would not imply neglecting such policies, but 
certainly would call for group-specific measures in case different dynamics exist. 
On strict grounds of time series analysis, unemployment persistence was first empirically 
assessed by Blanchard and Summers (1987, who pointed out that the degree of persistence may 
be caused primarily by abrupt changes in the mean rate of unemployment due to sequences of 
shocks. Bianchi and Zoega (1998) found, however, that a significant part of the observed 
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persistence in unemployment is accounted for a few large shocks rather than a sequence of 
small shocks all having a persistent effect. 
Accordingly, this paper aims at identifying potential breaks in European unemployment 
due to the occurrence of single definitive events: the settlement of a monetary union in 1999 
and the Euro/financial crisis in 2008-2009, which was followed by an intensive and extensive 
reform process. In this paper we seek to answer pertinent questions such as: Can the large 
dispersion in unemployment rates across the euro zone area be attributed to the adoption of the 
single currency? Or has the latter led instead to a more similar labour market performance? Has 
the euro crisis contributed to an increase in structural unemployment? If so, for which 
countries? Are there hysteresis effects on European unemployment emanating from the current 
crisis? 
The analysis of the occurrence of structural breaks in unemployment across euro area 
countries can provide an answer to these questions: the fact that, for example, structural breaks 
located around the introduction of the euro could appear in peripheral countries, but not in core 
countries, could be interpreted as a signal that the adoption of the single currency had 
asymmetric effects on the unemployment behaviour across euro zone countries. This situation 
however cannot be necessarily interpreted as a divergence effect in unemployment arising from 
the adoption of the euro. Rather, it may signal the fact that peripheral countries are catching-
up to the core countries level in terms of, for example, competitiveness and thereby, in terms 
of labour market performance. To assess whether this is the case, we will analyse the trend 
behaviour in structural unemployment before and after the estimated shocks. Similarly to the 
introduction of the euro, the analysis of structural breaks can help to determine whether, as a 
consequence of the crisis, structural unemployment in European countries has increased. The 
larger the increase in structural unemployment, the higher will be the probability of having a 
new episode of high and persistent unemployment in Europe. From a policy point of view, the 
analysis of structural breaks is also important to test whether the European Employment 
strategy and the Lisbon Agenda had any effect in European unemployment behaviour. 
Perron (1988) pointed out that the correct specification of the trend is important when 
considering whether a unit root is present in the data. This is particularly relevant, for if the 
data contains a unit root then the method of least squares to estimate the trend will suffer from 
size distortions. Alternatively, if the data is modelled as a difference stationary process when 
it is actually a trend stationary process, then the test will be inefficient and lack power relative 
to the trend stationary process (Perron and Yabu 2009a). The presence of structural breaks 
further complicates the process, as neglecting a break in an otherwise trend stationary process 
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can lead to the conclusion of a spurious unit root in the data (Perron 1989), while ignoring a 
trend break in a difference stationary process can lead the unit root test to the false conclusion 
that the data is stationary (Leybourne et al., 1998). Therefore, when using the approach to test 
for unit roots while allowing for structural breaks in the trend function of the underlying data, 
the inference drawn from the structural break test on the level of the data depends on whether 
a unit root exists, while the test based on differenced data can have poor properties when the 
data contains a stationary component (Vogelsang,1998). This problem underscores the need to 
employ structural break tests that allows one to be agnostic to the nature of serial correlation 
in the data. To this end, we employ robust methods of Perron and Yabu (2009b) and Kejriwal 
and Perron (2010) to determine structural break points. Once the breaks (if any) are identified, 
we demarcate regimes based on the number of break points. We then proceed to estimate the 
trends for the individual unemployment regimes identified by the break points. Where no 
breaks are found, we estimate the trend over the entire sample. If we find a single structural 
break, we estimate the trends for the two regimes demarcated by the break point. In the presence 
of two breaks, three slope regimes are estimated. 
The advantage of measuring the trends using the method of Perron and Yabu (2009a) is 
that we can be completely agnostic about the underlying order of integration of the data series, 
either for the individual regimes or the entire sample. Motivated by these considerations, this 
paper makes a robust detection of structural breaks, robust estimation of the break locations 
and the trend of the regimes identified by the estimated break dates.The euro crisis has also put 
on the top of the European economic agenda the issue of high youth unemployment and the 
need of implementing specific policy measures to cope with it. Despite the political consensus 
about this need, some authors have suggested that “it is not at all clear that young people suffer 
more from being unemployed than older people, or even disproportionately more than older 
unemployed individuals. In particular, it is not clear that the much-publicised notion of a ‘lost 
generation’ with permanent ‘scars’ is relevant only to the young generation” (Barslund and 
Gross, 2013, p. 2). To shed some light on this debate, we will test for structural breaks in both 
youth and adult structural unemployment to assess whether the trend behaviour after the crisis 
is different between both groups of unemployed. 
On this point, our empirical results entail a variety of policy implications. The finding of 
structural breaks accompanied by statistically significant slope changes in the rate of 
unemployment can be associated to changes in the equilibrium rate of unemployment. In that 
case, the standard policy recipe takes the form of structural reforms to improve the institutional 
design and, thereby, help the performance of the labour market. On the contrary, in the absence 
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of structural breaks, divergence from the equilibrium unemployment rate should be managed 
preferably through demand-side and growth oriented policies.1 
The less standard and more novel case, however, is the one in which a different behaviour 
is identified for a different group (youth, adult) in a given country. Although youth and adults 
may benefit from group-targeted policy measures, they are all subject to the same general 
institutional framework. This implies that generic recommendations in terms of structural 
reforms may have to be complemented by more specific measures. In view of our findings, 
these complementary policies ought to emphasise better educational records and improvement 
of school-to-work transitions. In this way, youth would become less prone to reduce their 
participation rates when the economy is hit by a severe shock such as the Great Recession, and 
much less exposed to become part of the ‘Not in Education Employment or Training’(NEET). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
discussing the effects of both the single monetary policy and the current economic crisis on 
unemployment. Section 3 presents the theoretical and empirical evidence on the different 
behaviour of youth and adult unemployment rates. Section 4 discusses how structural 
unemployment is obtained, whereas Section 5 explains the methodology. The results are 
presented in Section 6 and discussed in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Unemployment in Europe: the effects of EMU and the crisis. 
2.1. The euro. 
 Under the traditional macroeconomic paradigm, we should not expect any effect from 
the adoption of a single monetary policy on unemployment since monetary policy is neutral in 
the long-run and the creation of a monetary union is just a change in the monetary regime. 
However, in order to join the monetary union, the countries had to fulfil certain conditions, as 
the Maastricht Treaty, as well as the Stability and Growth Pact once in the euro zone. The 
institutional framework of the EMU imposed asymmetric relationships between a centralized 
monetary policy, restricted national fiscal policies and uncoordinated wage policies. The design 
of the economic governance of the euro and the deepening process of European integration 
zone influenced the European macroeconomic scenario, as well as the organization and the 
                                                          
1 The finding of structural breaks and non-significant slope changes should be in principle associated to the need 
of demand-side and growth oriented policies on account of the absence of evidence of a change in the equilibrium 
unemployment rate. Nevertheless this is, in fact, an intermediate case in which the statistical results are in between 
the two neat cases leading to relatively safe recommendations. To the extent that this intermediate position is 
highly dependent on the statistical robustness of the results, these cases should be interpreted with more caution 
than the others (see Tables 3 and 4). 
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functioning of European labour markets through changes in the economic environment in 
which these markets operate. The elimination of exchange rate fluctuations also led to a further 
increase in product market integration, and intensification of competition and regulation. In 
addition, the common currency increased price transparency, exposing national firms to a 
higher level of competition. All these factors have certainly affected nominal wage and price 
settings. 
 Some authors have suggested that the EMU have also affected the wage-bargaining 
setting through an increase in both national and transnational wage-bargaining coordination, 
although some others did point out that this process would be rather dubious (Calmfors, 2001). 
Also, Cukierman and Lippi (2001, p. 541) suggested that the EMU formation reduced unions’ 
perceptions of the inflationary repercussions of their individual wages, inducing them to be 
more aggressive in their wage demands.  
 Having lost an important stabilizing tool such as the monetary policy, it has been argued 
that EMU countries have increased their labour market flexibility as a complementary 
mechanism to cope with adverse shocks. This is in contrast to the view that a monetary union 
can weaken the incentives for national labour market reform, since uncoordinated policy 
making can lead to more reform as countries attempt to protect themselves from others’ beggar-
thy-neighbour policies (Sibert and Sutherland, 2000). 
 Overall, the effects of the EMU on the national labour markets remains a contentious 
issue calling for further analysis to conclude whether the unemployment behaviour across euro 
zone countries has changed as a consequence of the introduction of the single currency or, 
rather, it is a phenomenon observed in some, but not all, EMU countries. 
2.2. The crisis. 
 Another strand of the literature claims that the recent economic crisis has had an 
unequal impact on the EU labour markets. As stated above, periphery countries with serious 
debt sustainability problems have been severely affected in terms of job destruction. In 
addition, as suggested by Tridico (2013), those countries that pursued a model based on 
flexibility alone (Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom, for example) experienced a worse 
labour market performance. Some of the EU western countries (France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom) suffered a double dip, Greece and Ireland experienced 
multiple dips, whereas the rest of the EU western economies have had at least one year of 
output contraction. The question now is whether the effects coming from the crisis have 
translated into structural breaks on unemployment and for which countries. 
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 The financial nature of the crisis may have also an important role in the behaviour of 
labour markets through the decline in output and investment associated with heightened 
uncertainty, higher risk premia, and tighter lending standards (Hall, 2009). As suggested by 
Calvo et al. (2012), financial crisis tend to be followed by jobless recoveries in the presence of 
low inflation, and by significant lower real wage recoveries in the presence of high inflation. 
Hysteresis effects in the presence of jobless recoveries can lead to an increase in both long-
term and structural unemployment. Boeri, et al. (2013) find that financial recessions amplify 
labour market volatility and Okun’s elasticity over the business cycle. 
Overall, the labour market impact of the crisis is still calling for attention, especially 
with regard to its disaggregated impact by groups, and its youth bias. 
 
3. Unemployment in Europe: youth versus adult unemployment. 
 Youth unemployment rates in the EU vary widely across countries and regions and have 
been exacerbated during the crisis increasing from 15.5 percent in 2007 to 23.5 percent in 2013, 
and being generally more than twice as high as the adult unemployment rates. The latter can 
be partly explained because of a smaller youth labour force.  However, official youth 
unemployment rates are also likely to be an underestimate measure of the true problem since 
the discouraged worker effect is higher for youngsters given that they can opt to continue their 
education or simply live with their families. These options reduce robust search efforts if 
finding a job is difficult, and can potentially lead to the so-called NEET.  
 Youth unemployment responds to the same two main drivers of (adult) unemployment, 
as discussed in Section 2; that is, business cycles and the institutional setup as well as features 
of the labour market. However, the impact of these factors can be different for youth and adult 
unemployment. According to Ryan (2001), youth unemployment tends to be super-cyclical, 
meaning that it is more sensitive to the business cycle than adult unemployment. IMF (2014) 
reports that cyclical factors explain 50 percent of the changes in youth unemployment rate, 
though 70 percent in stressed euro area countries. The sensitivity of youth unemployment to 
the business cycle can be explained due to special features of youth employment, such as the 
concentration of youth employment in cyclically sensitive industries and in small and medium-
size enterprises (see OECD, 2006; Scarpetta, et. al, 2010; European Commission, 2013).  
 Labour market characteristics can also have an impact on youth unemployment for the 
following two reasons: First, youth population have lower levels of human capital, skills and 
generic and job-specific work experience. As a consequence, youth productivity is lower and 
they are more exposed to long-term unemployment, unstable and low-quality jobs, and perhaps 
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social exclusion (OECD, 2005). In the specific case of Europe, Pastore (2015) argues that the 
youth experience gap is the key factor to understand why youth unemployment in Europe is 
much higher. Secondly, the institutional framework is also relevant through the existence of 
dual labour markets and temporary jobs (Bertola et al., 2007; Nunziata and Staffolani, 2007), 
hiring and firing regulations, minimum wages relative to the median wage and firing costs 
(Neumark and Wascher, 2004; Bernal-Verdugo, 2012), unionization (Bertola, et al., 2007), or 
the school-to-work-transition (Ryan, 2001) and the university-to-work-transition (Sciulli and 
Signorelli, 2011) institutions. 
 
4. Data and computation of monthly structural unemployment. 
The data employed in this study consists of monthly observations for overall, adult and 
youth unemployment in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The 
data was obtained from Eurostat. The sample period runs from January 1993, the starting year 
of the common market within the European Economic Community, to September 2013. 
 Actual unemployment rates are traditionally decomposed into ‘structural’ and ‘cyclical’ 
unemployment. Structural unemployment is the rate of unemployment that would be observed 
if the economy were not hit by shocks (either demand or supply shocks), if inflation were held 
at a low steady state, and the economy grew smoothly. Hence, structural unemployment reflects 
a range of structural factors such as the efficiency of the labour market, the demographic 
features of the labour force, or the labour market institutions, and is attained when the economy 
comes to rest at potential output. Cyclical unemployment is the higher (lower) unemployment 
due to a recession (or boom) and results therefore from shocks. 
 The distinction between structural and cyclical unemployment can be difficult. 
Structural unemployment can rise because of sectoral changes leading to more mismatch, poor 
recruiting or job-finding tools, adverse changes in demographic features of the labour force or 
changes in labour market institutions, but also, due to prolonged periods of high cyclical 
unemployment. The fact that a rise in actual rate of unemployment leads to an increase (perhaps 
even an equal increase) in the underlying structural or equilibrium unemployment rate is 
commonly known as unemployment hysteresis (Blanchard and Summers, 1987; Røed, 1997). 
In the presence of hysteresis, increases in unemployment will have long-lasting effects, with 
substantial costs in terms of higher inflation and lost output and income (O'Shaughnessy, 
2011). 
Following Shimer (2005), and subsequent studies, monthly structural unemployment in 
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this paper is obtained using the Hodrik-Prescott (HP) filter. This approach opens up the issue 
of how the notion of structural unemployment can be best studied in an empirical sense. It is 
well-known that a variety of related concepts --such as Natural Rate of Unemployment, 
NAIRU, steady state, frictionless equilibrium-- coexist in the literature. A variety of methods, 
ranging from the estimation of structural models to the filtering of the unemployment series 
(using various techniques), have been employed to provide empirical estimations of these 
concepts. Here we use the HP filter for the following two reasons. 
First, the use of monthly data for 16 countries prevents considering standard institutional 
controls used, for example, in five-years average panel data estimation. Even the use of 
quarterly data would greatly reduce the availability of suitable controls and, thus, the possibility 
of using alternative methods. However, given that we are interested in considering a 
meaningful period (our sample starts at the inception of the European common market, the 
integration stage before the EMU), using monthly data provides us with enough degrees of 
freedom to conduct our analysis. 
Secondly, a very popular strand of the literature using the Diamond-Mortensen-
Pissarides framework has proceeded in the same way allowing us to compare our findings. The 
difference is that in such search-and-matching models, à la Shimer (2005) and beyond, it is the 
structural component that is removed from the analysis (and the business cycle component that 
is retained), while in this study we are interested in the structural part of the unemployment 
rate series. Here it should be noted that the sensitivity of the results to the HP filter is greatly 
reduced as it is the trend component that is being retained and analysed. Moreover, irrespective 
of the method, we are interested in comparing the outcome of our time series analysis for the 
adult and youth unemployment rates across 16 economies. Thus, comparability is granted 
provided the same method is used for the different series, as it is obviously done here. 
 
5. Econometric methodology. 
To estimate trends in unemployment data for the various countries chosen in this study, 
we consider the following model: 
 
𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡,  𝑢𝑡 = 𝜓𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡,     [1] 
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where 𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃 denotes the unemployment rate, 𝑢𝑡 measures the deviation from trend, which 
is described in this case as an AR(1) process2. The parameter 𝛽, which measures the trend, is 
the hypothesis of interest. If the trend is significant, that is, we reject 𝐻0: (𝛽 = 0), then we 
proceed to observe (i) whether the trend is negative, that is (𝛽 < 0), to conclude that the 
unemployment rate has fallen over time, or (ii) whether the trend is positive, that is (𝛽 > 0), 
to conclude that the real unemployment rate has increased over time. 
Consider the model given by [1] where the error term is specified as an AR(1) model. 
The weighted least squares (WLS) is calculated using the following: 
 
𝜇𝑊 = ∑ ?̂?𝑡?̂?𝑡−1 (∑ ?̂?𝑡
2 + 1 𝑇⁄ ∑ ?̂?𝑡
2)⁄        [2] 
 
where 𝜇𝑊 denotes the weighted least square estimate and 𝑇 denotes the total number of 
observations in the sample. Following Roy and Fuller (2001), we obtain the unbiased estimates 
?̂?𝑈𝐵, and following Andrews (1993) the median unbiased estimates ?̂?𝑀𝑈 are calculated. Perron 
and Yabu (2009a) then obtain the following super-efficient estimate as follows: 
 
?̂?𝑈𝑆 = {
?̂?𝑈𝐵 if  |?̂?𝑈𝐵 − 1| > 𝑇
−1 2⁄
1 if  |?̂?𝑈𝐵 − 1| ≤ 𝑇
−1 2⁄
       [3] 
 
or, 
 
?̂?𝑀𝑆 = {
?̂?𝑀𝑈 if  |?̂?𝑀𝑈 − 1| > 𝑇
−1 2⁄
1 if  |?̂?𝑀𝑈 − 1| ≤ 𝑇
−1 2⁄
       [4] 
 
where ?̂?𝑈𝑆 and or ?̂?𝑀𝑆 are the super-efficient estimates based on the unbiased estimate and the 
median unbiased estimate respectively. The Feasible Generalised Least Square (FGLS) 
procedure is applied to obtain the estimate of the trend parameter 𝛽 and construct the FGLS t–
statistic for the unbiased and median unbiased estimate; that is, 𝑡𝛽
𝐹(𝑈𝐵) and 
𝑡𝛽
𝐹(𝑀𝑈) respectively. 
However, if the errors in [1] are a higher order than AR(1), the estimate ?̂? is obtained 
from the following regression: 
                                                          
2 This assumption is relaxed in the following econometric analysis to allow for a general AR(p) process. To 
keep the description of the econometric methodology simple, we assume an AR(1) process at this stage. 
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?̂?𝑡 = 𝜇?̂?𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜍𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 Δ?̂?𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑒𝑡𝑘       [5] 
 
The lag length 𝑘 is selected using the Modified Akaike Information Criterion (MAIC) 
following Ng and Perron (2001) with 𝑘 allowing to be in the range [0, 12(𝑇 100⁄ )1 4⁄ ]. The 
weighted symmetric least squares estimator ?̂?𝑊 is constructed for an AR(p) process [see Fuller 
(1996, p.415)]. The truncated estimate ?̂?𝑀𝑈 (median unbiased estimator) or ?̂?𝑈𝐵 (unbiased 
estimator) is then applied to obtain the super-efficient unbiased estimate ?̂?𝑈𝑆 or super-efficient 
median unbiased estimate ?̂?𝑀𝑆 using [3] or [4] respectively. Finally, the quasi–FGLS procedure 
is applied to obtain the estimate of the trend parameter 𝛽 and construct the Robust Quasi-FGLS 
t–statistic for the unbiased and median unbiased estimate, that is, 𝑡𝛽
𝑅𝑄𝐹(𝑈𝐵) and 𝑡𝛽
𝑅𝑄𝐹(𝑀𝑈) 
respectively. Perron and Yabu (2009a) show that for a similar sample size as chosen in this 
study, the 𝑡𝛽
𝑅𝑄𝐹(𝑀𝑈) has some liberal size distortions in comparison to the 𝑡𝛽
𝑅𝑄𝐹(𝑈𝐵). When 
𝜓 = 1, 𝑡𝛽
𝑅𝑄𝐹(𝑀𝑈) and 𝑡𝛽
𝑅𝑄𝐹(𝑈𝐵) have similar power; however, when 𝜓 departs from unity 
𝑡𝛽
𝑅𝑄𝐹(𝑀𝑈) has comparatively higher power. For brevity, in this paper we estimate the median 
unbiased estimate only.3 
So far, the economic literature have proposed and applied different unit root tests with 
and without structural breaks. Usually we do not know in advance whether the time series are 
affected by structural breaks, which conditions the analysis that can be conducted using unit 
root tests. Thus, if breaks are not accounted for when in fact they have affected the time series, 
the unit root tests can be biased towards the non-rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root. 
On the other hand, allowing for inexistent breaks when computing the unit root tests can imply 
reductions in the empirical power of the statistics. This issue has been recently addressed in 
Perron and Yabu (2009b) allowing for breaks in the level and slope of the trend function given 
by [1]. Perron and Yabu (2009b) find that the exponential functional of the Wald test has a 
limiting distribution that is nearly the same for both I(0) and I(1) variables. Following Roy and 
Fuller (2001), a biased corrected version of the least squares estimate of ?̂? is carried out to 
allow for good size and power properties in finite samples. Perron and Yabu (2009b) design a 
test statistic—hereafter, the 𝐸𝑥𝑝 − 𝑊 break test statistic—that allows to test if there is a 
                                                          
3 We conducted the analysis and the unbiased estimates are broadly the same; the results are available 
on request. 
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structural break affecting the time trend of the series regardless of whether the series is I(0) or 
I(1). The test is as follows: 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑝 − 𝑊 = 𝑙𝑛 [
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (
1
2
𝑊(𝜆))]       [6] 
 
where 𝜆 denotes the break fraction and 𝑊denotes the Wald statistic. In this paper, we have 
computed the 𝐸𝑥𝑝 − 𝑊 break test statistic considering the model that allows for changes both 
in the level and the slope of the time trend, which is the most general specification. 
In the spirit of Perron and Yabu (2009b), a sequential procedure is proposed by Kejriwal 
and Perron (2010) that allows one to obtain a consistent estimate of the true number of breaks 
irrespective of whether the errors are I(1) or I(0). The first step is to conduct a test for no break 
versus one break. Conditional on a rejection, the estimated break date is obtained by a global 
minimization of the sum of squared residuals. The strategy proceeds by testing each of the two 
segments (obtained using the estimated partition) for the presence of an additional break and 
assessing whether the maximum of the tests is significant. Formally, the test of one versus two 
breaks is expressed as: 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑊(2|1) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥1≤𝑖≤2{𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑊
(𝑖)}       [7] 
 
where 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑊(𝑖) is the one break test in segment 𝑖. We conclude in favour of a model with 
two breaks if 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑊(2|1) is sufficiently large. 
 
6. Empirical Results 
The full set of empirical results obtained from applying this methodology are presented 
in the Appendix. The first set of tables show the number of breaks and their corresponding 
dates for the trend components of total unemployment (Table A1), youth unemployment (Table 
A2), and adult unemployment (Table A3). In each of the Tables the exponential Wald test 
(ExpW) statistics are calculated, first allowing for one break using the Perron and Yabu (2009b) 
test. If a break is found we then adopt the sequential break test due to Kejriwal and Perron 
(2010). The number of breaks are listed in the designated column in Tables A.1 to A.3 and the 
preponderance of breaks is noted to fall around the introduction of the EMU or the occurrence 
of the financial crisis. Tables A4 to A6 show, respectively, the slope changes in the individual 
regimes that are demarcated by the structural breaks. What is interesting to note, is that the 
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results are varied with no common pattern. However, it is clear that the sample period 
considered is characterised by broken trends that could be positive, negative or insignificant. 
Given the density of this information, Table A7 provides a qualitative summary of the results 
presented in Tables A1 to A6. The results obtained raise some significant findings as follows. 
First, the analysis based on the aggregate unemployment rate fails to uncover significant 
differences in the unemployment dynamics of the youth and adult unemployment rates. 
Secondly, we find the existence of a similar number of structural breaks when adult and 
youth unemployment rates are examined. Therefore, there is no evidence that the trend 
component of the youth unemployment rate is more responsive than the adult one. In other 
words, differences between aggregate and youth unemployment take the form of enhanced 
volatilities in response to temporary shocks (as the literature has shown), but do not show up, 
as a general feature across countries, in the form of different intensities in their response to 
structural breaks. 
Thirdly, a significant finding is that a structural break occurred in the aftermath of the 
Eurozone creation in January 1999 and affected adult unemployment rates in the Continental 
European countries (Belgium, Germany, Finland, Luxembourg, and Netherlands), together 
with Portugal. Moreover, this break entailed a significant slope change with the exception of 
Belgium. Note that these are, in general, economies that undertook significant reforms at the 
time. For example, Germany with the Act on part-time work and fixed term employment 
relationships (Gesetz uber Teilzeitarbeit und befristete Arbeitsvertrage) passed in December 
2000, followed by the Hartz reforms; the Netherlands with the Part-Time Employment Act 
passed in February 2000 as part of the framework Work and Care Act; or Finland with Act n. 
55/2001 to reform the Employment Contracts Act or Act n. 944/2003 to create individualised 
programmes for all long-term unemployed. 
Regarding youth unemployment, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands also 
experienced a structural break with slope change, while the rest did not. 
On the contrary, Southern European periphery economies did not experience the EMU 
break in terms of unemployment. This group is made of the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, 
Greece and Spain) plus France, but may also be defined as including the Club-Med countries 
together with Ireland. Our hypothesis is that this cluster is made of the economies that 
experienced more pressure to comply with the Maastricht Criteria, since they were economies 
with a wider gap with respect to the leading ones (mainly in the Continental European group). 
 
 
 15 
Figure 3. Summary of the EMU break. 
 EUROZONE COUNTRIES  COUNTRIES NOT IN THE EUROZONE 
 
STRUCTURAL BREAK          
+                         
SIGNIFICANT SLOPE 
CHANGE 
STRUCTURAL BREAK          
BUT                                   
NON-SIGNIFICANT SLOPE 
CHANGE 
NO STRUCTURAL BREAK  
 
STRUCTURAL BREAK          
+                         
SIGNIFICANT SLOPE 
CHANGE 
STRUCTURAL BREAK          
BUT                                   
NON-SIGNIFICANT SLOPE 
CHANGE 
NO STRUCTURAL BREAK  
        
ADULT 
GERMANY,             
FINLAND,    
LUXEMBOURG, 
NETHERLANDS, 
PORTUGAL 
BELGIUM 
AUSTRIA,                       
FRANCE,                    
GREECE,                  
IRELAND,                       
ITALY,                            
SPAIN  
NORWAY SWEDEN 
U.K.,                                         
DENMARK 
        
YOUTH 
BELGIUM,            
GERMANY,             
IRELAND,    
NETHERLANDS 
AUSTRIA,                   
FRANCE,                          
GREECE 
FINLAND,                  
ITALY,         
LUXEMBOURG, 
PORTUGAL,                 
SPAIN  
SWEDEN,                           
U.K.  
NORWAY,                                         
DENMARK 
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Figure 4. Summary of the Euro/Financial crisis break. 
 EUROZONE COUNTRIES  COUNTRIES NOT IN THE EUROZONE 
 
STRUCTURAL BREAK          
+                         
SIGNIFICANT SLOPE 
CHANGE 
STRUCTURAL BREAK          
BUT                                   
NON-SIGNIFICANT 
SLOPE CHANGE 
NO STRUCTURAL BREAK  
 
STRUCTURAL BREAK          
+                         
SIGNIFICANT SLOPE 
CHANGE 
STRUCTURAL BREAK          
BUT                                   
NON-SIGNIFICANT 
SLOPE CHANGE 
NO STRUCTURAL BREAK  
        
ADULT 
AUSTRIA,                       
FRANCE,                    
GREECE,                  
IRELAND,                       
ITALY,             
NETHERLANDS,                            
SPAIN 
FINLAND 
BELGIUM,             
GERMANY,             
LUXEMBOURG, PORTUGAL 
 
U.K. DENMARK                
NORWAY, 
SWEDEN 
        
YOUTH  BELGIUM 
AUSTRIA,               
BELGIUM,            
GERMANY,            
FINLAND,                   
FRANCE,                 
IRELAND,                      
ITALY,           
LUXEMBOURG,                                              
NETHERLANDS,    
PORTUGAL,                 
SPAIN  
 U.K. 
DENMARK,               
NORWAY,               
SWEDEN 
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Finally, Austria, which is not clustered with the Continental European economies by the 
tests (neither when its youth or when its adult unemployment rates are examined), and 
Luxembourg (clustered with the PIIGS when the youth unemployment rates are examined), 
record poor figures for youth unemployment (Figure 2) between 1999 and 2014, even though 
they appear to do rather well in terms of adult unemployment (Figure 1). During these years, 
youth unemployment doubled in Austria (from 5% to 10%) while it more than tripled in 
Luxembourg (from 7% to 22%). If we add the PIIGS, we have the set of economies where 
youth population has suffered the most with respect to the unemployment problem in the Euro 
years. 
Our results may be compared with those in Romero-Ávila and Usabiaga (2008, 2009), 
who study the main unemployment paradigms over the period 1976 to 2004 by employing 
panel stationarity tests due to Camarero et al. (2006) and Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2005), that 
allows for an unknown number of endogenous structural breaks. While their chosen time-
period does not match with our study, interestingly, the timing of the breaks around 1999 is 
reflected in both studies. As noted by Romero-Ávila and Usabiaga (2009), their methodology 
requires elimination of endpoints (due to a 15% trimming) preventing them from detecting 
structural breaks associated with some institutional reforms aimed at making European labour 
markets more ﬂexible which took place after 1999. 
The second major structural break took place around 2008 with the onset of the 
worldwide Financial Crisis and the subsequent Sovereign-Debt crisis in the Eurozone 
countries. 
This break, in contrast to the EMU one, is found to severely affect the Club-Med 
countries, France and the PIIGS (with the exception of Portugal), together with Austria and the 
Netherlands. This is the group of economies with a structural break affecting their adult 
unemployment rates and causing significant slope changes in the corresponding new 
unemployment regimes. On the contrary, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg have not 
experienced a regime change, while the one in Finland was not significant. The absence of 
Netherlands in this group is explained by the fact that a relatively large part of the economic 
shock was translated into unemployment (de Graaf-Zijl et al., 2015). 
This result may be connected with the intensity of the Sovereign-Debt crisis. Together 
with Portugal, whose labour market has always evolved remarkably well relative to the Spanish 
one, which is very similar (see Blanchard and Jimeno, 1995), the Club-Med countries are the 
ones that have suffered the Great Recession more intensively. Note that these are, precisely, 
the economies that did not embark in institutional reforms at the start of the EMU period and 
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were, thus, less prepared to compete without the possibility of currency devaluations. In the 
absence of such reforms and divergence in the degree of competitiveness (as indicated, for 
example, by the evolution of the real unit labour costs as it has been shown by Ordóñez et al., 
2015), they became highly indebted economies; first at the private level, then at the public one, 
so that the impact of the Great Recession was reflected, among other things, in new and higher 
unemployment rate regimes. 
The most salient result regarding this second major shock is related to the youth 
unemployment rates, which show a complete absence of evidence that the Euro and Financial 
crisis break has caused a regime change in this segment of the labour market. Although, at first 
sight, it would be tempting to see this result as positive (to the extent that larger structural youth 
unemployment rates seem to have been avoided), we claim that it brings truly bad news. 
The reason of our pessimist assessment lies on the fact that although youth are not as 
much caught into long-term unemployment as adults, they may end up in a worse situation. 
The first reason is that the youth have the possibility of temporarily leaving the labour market, 
as they have done in response to the crisis. As shown by Figure 5, the youths in the EU have 
reduced their participation rates more intensively in the economies where youth unemployment 
has worsened (recall Figure 2). This is clearly the case of the PIIGS and Luxembourg, which 
is the country with the lowest youth participation rate (26%), then followed by Italy. Further, 
it should be noted that some of the most affected economies had much higher participation 
rates in 1999 (Ireland 54%, Portugal 47%, Spain 43%) than today, and even that these 
participation rates were close to the ones in Germany (stable at around 50%) and larger than in 
Belgium or France (where they are below 40%). 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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The second reason why youth may find that their situation deteriorates, is that a 
significant proportion of them may abandon the education system. The growing relevance of 
this phenomenon has given rise to a significant increase of the NEET, especially in the 
economies most affected by the crisis (see O’Higgins, 2015). As shown in Figure 6, this group 
accounts for around 20% of the persons between 15 and 24 years old in Spain, Greece and 
Italy, followed by Ireland and Portugal with values around 15%. 
 
 
Source: International Labour Office. 
 
7. Discussion and policy implications 
Youth unemployment is one of the most worrying legacies of the Great Recession 
(O’Higgins, 2015). One approach to discuss possible solutions to reduce this problem is to 
evaluate the specific effectiveness, for the youth, of active labour market policies (ALMPs). 
An extensive appraisal along these lines has recently been conducted in Caliendo and Schmidl 
(2016). Another approach is to rely on macro-oriented analysis, such as ours, to elucidate which 
economies seem to be in need of more intensive structural reforms and whether these reforms 
should be designed more generically (i.e., for all groups) or more targeted towards some 
specific groups. 
However, general conclusions from macro-oriented analyses are based on the finding of 
cross-country asymmetries (for example, in terms of salient increases in structural 
unemployment rates), and result in economic policy recipes at the country level. This is the 
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case of the studies by Fosten and Ghoshray (2011) or Srinivasan and Mitra (2014). For a given 
country (that is, in a situation in which labour market institutions and regulations are basically 
shared by both youth and adults), in case of significant group asymmetries, general policy 
recipes may be of a limited effectiveness. This is the case of the structural break related to the 
Euro/Financial crisis, which caused a significant impact on structural adult unemployment in 
some economies, but did not cause a (significant) structural break in any country in terms of 
youth unemployment. 
Given the associated fall in participation rates and the increases in the youth NEET, we 
claim that it is essential to complement generic institutional measures with policies that 
enhance and improve transitions from the educational system to the labour market. This claim 
emerges from recognizing the close correlation between those economies having experienced 
the worse performance of youth unemployment along the Euro and Financial crisis, and those 
displaying the worst performance on the PISA scores (displayed in Figure 7). In addition, we 
can also signal the case of Sweden, which is close to the bottom in PISA scores (after having 
fallen successively wave after wave), and has experienced a clear increase from 12% to 23% 
in youth unemployment. 
 
 
Source: OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). 
 
Of course, one could argue that this is just a one-off observation, but we can extend this 
analysis to the PIAAC scores, which reflect the average qualification level of the adult 
population. Since adult population is composed of different cohorts having exited from the 
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educational system in different decades, a positive correlation in this case would probably 
reflect a more structural relationship between the structural performance of the educational 
system and the labour market resilience to shocks. 
As shown by Figure 8, the PIAAC scores show that the Club-Med economies are those 
at the bottom position. At the top of the scale, in contrast, we find the Netherlands and Finland, 
two of the economies with youth unemployment rates that have not changed much between 
1999-2014 in clear contrast with the PIIGS (recall Figure 2). Also, most Scandinavian countries 
are perched in the upper position and, coincidentally, do not display any sort of youth 
unemployment problem (with the already mentioned exception of Sweden). 
 
 
Source: OECD Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC). 
 
Note, that if we had not conducted a time series analysis separately for youth and adult 
unemployment rates, we would not have identified the structural breaks in youth 
unemployment as consequence of the Euro and Financial crisis. It is this finding of the 
preponderance of breaks around these two significant events, that has allowed our analysis to 
move beyond the standard policy recommendation of implementing structural reforms, and 
instead focus on the consequences that poor qualifications and a poor performance of the 
educational system may have for the performance of the labour market. These complementary 
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policies would help to surpass recession periods by minimizing the social and economic costs 
of youth unemployment and protracted periods of moving out of education and training.4 
Related to this discussion, and also connected to the age composition of the workers, the 
long-term unemployment problem appears as a critical complementary issue. For example, the 
Netherlands (whose adult unemployment rate appears together with the PIIGS in Table 4) has 
faced worse long-term unemployment rates than its neighbours. As explained in de Graaf-Zijl 
et al. (2015), 40% of these unemployed workers are over 50 years old. In contrast, in Denmark 
(which in Table 4 is classified as not experiencing a significant structural break in adult 
unemployment) most unemployment spells are short, and there are no worrying signs of long-
term unemployment (Andersen, 2015). Therefore, although youth unemployment is a critical 
problem, we should not disregard the adverse effects of long-term unemployment on adult 
population. 
 
8. Conclusions 
Aggregate unemployment hides significantly different behaviours in adult and youth 
unemployment. As a consequence, specific attention needs to be devoted to these two 
components of unemployment. This paper makes a concerted analysis to analyse these two 
components separately for various EU countries. Novel methods are employed to detect 
structural breaks and the preponderance of these breaks are associated to two major single-
event shocks occurred in Europe in recent times: the inception of the EMU in 1999 and the 
Euro and Financial crisis that took place in the aftermath of the burst of the housing and 
financial bubbles in 2008. 
We find that the structural break associated to the EMU is limited to those economies 
less affected by the Euro and Financial Crisis. This is in general the case for both adult and 
youth unemployment rates. In contrast, the structural break associated to the Euro and the 
Financial Crisis had greater impact on those economies with very poor aggregate labour market 
performance such as Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. This underscores one of the main 
conclusions of this study. Economies in the European periphery were to some extent inattentive 
in preparing themselves for the new scenario brought by the EMU. They were active and 
successful in securing nominal convergence ex-ante, but the lack of real convergence (for 
                                                          
4 Lack and/or shortage of data prevents us from conducting meaningful time series analysis on the causality 
between indicators of educational performance and youth unemployment or youth labour force participation. A 
panel data analysis would compensate the short time-series with cross-section observations; however, embarking 
in such a complementary quantitative analysis exceeds the scope of this ‘stepping stone’ paper. 
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example, in competitiveness, as shown by Ordóñez et al., 2015) caused very different impacts 
of the Great Recession on their labour markets. 
Nevertheless, in general, youth unemployment rates did not experience significant 
structural breaks across Europe as a result of the Euro and Financial crisis. This confirms the 
well-known enhanced volatility of youth unemployment vis-à-vis adult unemployment, and 
leads us to conclude that underlying this wider volatility there is the possibility, for youth, of 
responding to shocks without experiencing shifts in structural unemployment. Lower 
involvement in the labour market (falling participation rates), and lower involvement in 
education activities (growing NEETs) would be alternative or complementary outcomes to the 
shifts in structural unemployment experienced by the adult section. 
We have also claimed that the relative behaviour of youth unemployment across 
countries is highly associated to the relative performance of the educational system. Although 
this is not new in the literature, we have uncovered this association as a potentially structural 
phenomenon, since this seems to hold not only for the youth, but also for adult education. To 
the extent that adult education involves several generations, this creates a persistent mechanism 
by which poor educational levels end up affecting labour market performance in extenso. 
Microeconomic studies have warned us on the social and economic risks of individuals leaving 
the educational system at the early stages in their life. Here we complement this fact with an 
additional warning that emerges from the long lasting effects of a poor educational system: 
poor educational levels may harm extensively the performance of the labour market. That 
underlines one of our major conclusions: the educational system is a crucial tool to help 
restoring socially acceptable youth unemployment rates, which today remain stubbornly at an 
average of 20% in the Eurozone. We believe this area deserves much more attention from a 
macroeconomic point of view. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. Results for Structural Breaks Tests. Total Trend Component. 
Country ExpW Exp W 
(2|1) 
No. of 
Breaks 
EMU Euro/ 
financial  
crisis 
Other 
Belgium 1.25 1.70 2  2011m7 2001m1 
Denmark -0.25  0    
Germany 12.24 8.44 2 1999m5 2011m7  
Ireland 1.21 15.15 2 1999m7 2006m6  
Spain 3.86 4.42 2 1999m10 2007m4  
France 3.57 5.16 2 2000m9  2004m2 
Italy 0.89  0    
Holland 0.29  0    
Austria 2.49 8.42 2 2000m4  1997m2 
Portugal 12.20 1.34 1   2003m3 
Finland 16.79 2.53 2   2001m5 
1996m4 
Norway -0.14  0    
Sweden 0.85  0    
Luxembourg 3.52 12.15 2  2007m6 1996m4 
UK 1.71 15.19 2 1999m12 2011m7  
Greece 7.80 -0.04 1 2001m2   
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Table A2. Results for Structural Breaks Tests. Youth Trend Component. 
Country ExpW Exp W 
(2|1) 
No. of 
Breaks 
EMU Euro/ 
financial  
crisis 
Other 
Belgium 3.31 13.55 2 2001m3 2011m7  
Denmark -0.16  0    
Germany 8.47 8.69 2 1999m8  1996m4 
Ireland 1.15 29.27 2 1999m8  1996m4 
Spain -0.22  0    
France 5.03 0.23 1 2001m8   
Italy 8.10 0.13 1   1997m10 
Holland 2.54 2.90 2 2000m2  2003m12 
Austria 3.96 66.92 2 2000m4  1997m2 
Portugal 11.68 0.14 1   2002m6 
Finland 16.41 0.47 1   2002m1 
Norway 0.004  0    
Sweden 3.20 3.56 2 2000m2  2005m8 
Luxembourg 0.24  0    
UK 14.12 11.52 2 2000m1 2011m5  
Greece 10.15 16.09 2 2001m10  2004m4 
 
Table A3. Results for Structural Breaks Tests. Adult Trend Component. 
Country ExpW Exp W 
(2|1) 
No. of 
Breaks 
EMU Euro/ 
financial  
crisis 
Other 
Belgium 19.56 67.65 2 2000:6  1996:9 
Denmark 42.97 98.56 2  2007:5 1997:2 
Germany 134.26 73.95 2 2001:8  2004:12 
Ireland 69.56 163.68 2  2011:7 2004:11 
Spain 213.03 46.01 2  2011:7 2006:11 
France 56.11 105.48 2  2007:9 1996:9 
Italy 155.02 99.15 2  2008:4 1997:8 
Holland 33.17 159.83 2 2000:4 2010:10  
Austria 15.85 159.48 2  2008:9 2003:10 
Portugal 30.08 91.06 2 2001:2  1996:3 
Finland 138.06 170.16 2 2000:6 2007:12  
Norway 166.65 135.82 2 1999:2  2003:2 
Sweden 18.68 227.16 2 2000:11  1997:2 
Luxembourg 65.77 148.82 2 2001:2  2004:6 
UK 86.85 277.44 2  2011:7 2003:6 
Greece 272.82 42.64 2  2007:1 2003:12 
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Table A4. Slope Estimates. Total Trend Component. 
Country Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
Belgium -0.057 
(-0.0791, -0.0355) 
0.0634 
(0.0406, 0.0862) 
-0.1923 
(-0.4155, 0.0309) 
Denmark -0.0401 
(-0.313, 0.2328) 
  
Germany -0.1318 
(-0.2237, -0.0398) 
0.0034 
(-0.0038, 0.0107) 
0.1231 
(-0.2254, 0.4761) 
Ireland -0.0803 
(-0.1120,-0.0485) 
-0.0024 
(-0.0073, 0.0024) 
0.047 
(0.0339, 0.0601) 
Spain -0.0025 
(-0.0687, 0.0638) 
-0.0382 
(-0.057, -0.019) 
0.0367 
(0.0004, 0.0729) 
France -0.0382 
(-0.101, 0.0253) 
-0.01 
(-0.0177, -0.0023) 
0.0493 
(0.0384, 0.0603) 
Italy 0.0068 
(-0.0126, 0.0262) 
  
Holland 0.0126 
(-0.0186, 0.0438) 
  
Austria -0.0327 
(-0.1037, 0.0383) 
-0.0568 
(-0.1961, 0.0826) 
0.0006 
(-0.009, 0.103) 
Portugal -0.0486 
(-0.0989, 0.0016) 
0.0856 
(-0.7175, 0.8887) 
 
Finland -0.068 
(-0.1689, 0.033) 
-0.0491 
(-0.0541, -0.0441) 
0.015 
(0.013, 0.0169) 
Norway -0.0207 
(-0.2098, 0.1684) 
  
Sweden -0.024 
(-0.0655, 0.0174) 
  
Luxembourg -0.0948 
(-0.1966, 0.0071) 
-0.0068 
(-0.0346, 0.021) 
0.0236 
(0.0166, 0.0305) 
UK -0.0711 
(-0.1419, -0.0003) 
0.0109 
(0.000, 0.0217) 
0.1564 
(0.0128, 0.3001) 
Greece -0.0176 
(-0.0362, 0.0010) 
0.0010 
(-0.0083, 0.0103) 
 
Note: Numbers in square brackets denote 90% confidence intervals. 
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Table A5. Slope Estimates. Youth Trend Component. 
Country Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
Belgium -0.0836 
(-0.1087, -0.0585) 
0.143 
(0.0045, 0.2832) 
-0.6128 
(-1.572, 0.3471) 
Denmark -0.0786 
(-0.4808, 0.3236) 
  
Germany 0.1273 
(-0.3571, 0.1025) 
-0.7138 
(-1.08, -0.3475) 
0.0855 
(0.039, 0.1315) 
Ireland -0.203 
(-0.2699, 0.2107) 
-0.4511 
(0.7622, -0.1401) 
0.0726 
(0.0149, 0.1304) 
Spain 0.0423 
(-0.0579, 0.1426) 
  
France -0.1006 
(-0.1391, -0.0621) 
0.1962 
(-0.1359, 0.5283) 
 
Italy -0.0528 
(-0.1055, -0.0001) 
-0.0598 
(-0.0956, -0.0239) 
 
Holland -0.0908 
(-0.3418, 0.16) 
0.0711 
(0.062, 0.0802) 
0.163 
(0.0392, 0.2869) 
Austria 0.413 
(0.0827, 0.7443) 
0.0108 
(-0.4104, 0.432) 
-0.0074 
(-0.0304, 0.0155) 
Portugal -0.1567 
(-0.2456, -0.0677) 
0.1236 
(-0.2859, 0.5332) 
 
Finland -0.0736 
(-0.0861, -0.0611) 
0.0032 
(-0.0744, 0.0809) 
 
Norway -0.0329 
(-0.3081, 0.2422) 
  
Sweden -0.1729 
(-0.3496, 0.0038) 
0.1184 
(0.0896, 0.1473) 
0.0147 
(-0.0251, 0.0546) 
Luxembourg 0.0416 
(-0.009, 0.0924) 
  
UK -0.1105 
(-0.263, 0.0418) 
0.0379 
(0.0339, 0.0419) 
0.0103 
(-0.1533, 0.1739) 
Greece 0.0533 
(-0.239, 0.128) 
0.0853 
(-0.168, 0.338) 
0.0032 
(-0.0112, 0.0176) 
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Table A6. Slope Estimates Adult Unemployment. 
Country Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 
Belgium 0.0295 
(0.023, 0.028) 
-0.0457 
(-0.047, -0.044) 
0.008 
(-0.009, 0.025) 
Denmark -0.085 
(-0.094, -0.075) 
-0.015 
(-0.026, -0.001) 
0.025 
(-0.009, 0.061) 
Germany 0.005 
(-0.008, 0.018) 
0.048 
(0.033, 0.064) 
-0.046 
(-0.076, -0.016) 
Ireland -0.071 
(-0.130, -0.0118) 
0.119 
(0.100, 0.137) 
-0.085 
(-0.088, -0.0817) 
Spain -0.055 
(-0.142, 0.031) 
0.233 
(0.127, 0.34) 
0.061 
(0.041, 0.08) 
France 0.019 
(0.016, 0.021) 
-0.021 
(-0.056, 0.012) 
0.028 
(0.025, 0.031) 
Italy 0.041 
(0.035, 0.046) 
-0.024 
(-0.044, -0.003) 
0.072 
(0.061, 0.083) 
Holland -0.032 
(-0.036, -0.028) 
0.008 
(0.002, 0.014) 
0.062 
(0.06, 0.064) 
Austria 0.004 
(-0.019, 0.028) 
-0.009 
(-0.012, -0.006) 
0.015 
(0.008, 0.022) 
Portugal 0.042 
(0.034, 0.048) 
-0.033 
(-0.063, -0.0025) 
0.054 
(0.034, 0.073) 
Finland -0.069 
(-0.078, -0.060) 
-0.027 
(-0.033, -0.021) 
0.019 
(-0.004, 0.044) 
Norway -0.044 
(-0.045, -0.044) 
0.018 
(0.013, 0.023) 
-0.0001 
(-0.019, 0.018) 
Sweden 0.023 
(0.018, 0.028) 
-0.073 
(-0.132, -0.013) 
0.005 
(0.0002, 0.01) 
Luxembourg -0.005 
(-0.07, 0.06) 
0.049 
(0.044, 0.055) 
0.011 
(0.006, 0.016) 
UK -0.042 
(-0.053, -0.032) 
0.024 
(-0.019, 0.068) 
-0.042 
(-0.051, -0.032) 
Greece 0.063 
(-0.041, 0.167) 
-0.035 
(-0.041, -0.031) 
0.208 
(0.181, 0.236) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses denote 90% confidence intervals. Significant slope estimates denoted in bold. 
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Table A7. Qualitative Summary of the Results in Tables A1-A6. 
Country EMU Break Euro/financial crisis break 
 Total  Adult Youth Total Adult Youth 
Belgium No No Yes Yes No No 
Denmark No No No No No No 
Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Ireland Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Spain Yes No No Yes Yes No 
France Yes No No No Yes No 
Italy No No No No Yes No 
Holland No Yes Yes No Yes No 
Austria Yes No No No Yes No 
Portugal No Yes No No No No 
Finland No Yes No No No No 
Norway No Yes No No No No 
Sweden No No Yes No No No 
Luxembourg No Yes No Yes No No 
UK Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Greece Yes No No No Yes No 
Note: Yes stands for structural break with statistically significant change in the trending behaviour of 
unemployment. 
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